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1   For details of this transition, see Maria Löblich, 
  Die empirisch-sozialwissenschaftliche Wende in der    
  Publikations- und Zeitungswissenschaft (Köln: Von    
  Halem, 2010).
2  Jürgen Wilke, Presseanweisungen im zwanzigsten 
  Jahrhundert: Erster Weltkrieg, Drittes Reich, DDR    
  (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2007); Jürgen Wilke, Grundzüge
  der Medien- und Kommunikationsgeschichte: Von den    
  Anfängen bis ins 20. Jahrhundert (Köln: Böhlau, 2000);   
  Pressepolitik und Propaganda: Historische Studien vom    
  Vormärz bis zum Kalten Krieg (Köln: Böhlau, 1997);    
  Jürgen Wilke, Telegraphenbüros und Nachrichten-
  agenturen in Deutschland: Untersuchungen zu ihrer 
  Geschichte bis 1949 (München; New York: K.G. Saur, 1991).   
  This builds on work begun by Koszyk. See Kurt Koszyk,    
  Deutsche Presse, 1914-1945, vol. 3 (Berlin: Colloquium    
  Verlag, 1972); Kurt Koszyk, Deutsche Pressepolitik im Ersten  
  Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1968).
3  To cite some of the most prominent examples, Dominik  
  Geppert, Pressekriege: Öffentlichkeit und Diplomatie in    
  den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen (1896-1912); Frank   
  Bösch, Öffentliche Geheimnisse: Skandale, Politik und    
  Medien in Deutschland und Grossbritannien 1880-1914   
  (München: Oldenbourg, 2009), Corey Ross, Media and  
  the Making of Modern Germany: Mass Communica-   
  tions, Society, and Politics from the Empire to the Third    
  Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
4  Daniel R. Headrick, The invisible weapon: telecommun- 
  ications and international politics, 1851-1945 
  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Dwayne    
  Roy Winseck and Robert M. Pike, Communication and   
  empire: media, markets, and globalization, 1860-1930    
  (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).
Introduction
C
ommunications  history  sometimes  seems 
to be separated from other historical work 
by a methodological Grand Canyon. Communi-
cations history has increasingly emphasized the 
importance of quantitative, empirical work based 
on newspapers.1 There is also another strand of 
more qualitative archival work, especially led by 
Jürgen Wilke on the history of press institutions.2 
Despite this, historians have until relatively re-
cently rather neglected the study of the media. 
In Germany and England, at least, interest has 
grown considerably in the last few years.3 In the 
Anglo-American arena, on the other hand, histo-
rians have tended to be more interested in the in-
stitutional and technological background of the 
press such as the telegraph.4 Driven by different 
questions  about  the  media  and  different  me-
thodological backgrounds, the two groups have 
much to learn from each other. In this article, I 
will  address  historians’  methodological  debates 
about the pitfalls and promises of comparative 
and transnational history and illustrate through 
Peace through Truth? 
The Press and Moral Disarmament through the League of Nations
Heidi J. S. Tworek (Department of History, Harvard University)
Abstract
The League of Nations Assembly passed a resolution in September 1931 to consult the press 
about the “spread of false information which may threaten to disturb the peace or the good un-
derstanding between nations.” By September 1932, 16 nations and two international associations 
of journalists had replied with suggestions for the Third Conference of Press Experts in Madrid in 
1933. This article uses these proposals from journalists as a springboard to discuss how we can use 
comparative and transnational history to understand the press’s role during the interwar period. 
After analyzing the current methodological debates on comparative and transnational history, I 
address the uses of both for histories of the press. How can comparative or transnational history 
help us to investigate the press? How can scholars think about journalists’ associations and con-
ceptualize their role within the interwar diplomatic framework? More specifically, how did the 
press fit into the League of Nations’ efforts towards disarmament? Ultimately, an investigation of 
the two methodologies shows that we cannot class the press neatly into national boxes, but rather 
have to recognize the messy networks that overlapped, crisscrossed, and intersected to create those 
apparently national press systems.m&z 4/2010
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examples how historians’ approaches can inform 
work on the press.
The main example from my own research con-
cerns journalism and the League of Nations. For 
the League of Nations, the press was critical not 
only in relaying information about the League 
around the world, but also as an instrument to 
promote peace. The press was seen as an arm of 
moral disarmament. Moral disarmament aimed 
to be the “soft power” equivalent to negotiations 
on  material  disarmament.  It  sought  to  change 
ideas about diplomacy and conflict resolution by 
promoting conditions for peace through intellec-
tual cooperation and the press, along with various 
committees.
In the specific case I consider here, the League of 
Nations Assembly passed a resolution on 24th Sep-
tember 1931 on the cooperation of the press in 
the organization of peace. It asked the Secretary-
General to consult with the press about the mat-
ter of the “spread of false information which may 
threaten to disturb the peace or the good under-
standing between nations.” By September 1932, 
16 nations and two international associations of 
journalists had replied with various suggestions in 
time for the third Conference of Press Experts in 
Madrid in 1933. This article will use these answers 
along with the debates about accurate news at the 
Conference of Press Experts as a springboard to 
discuss how we can apply approaches from com-
parative and transnational history to understand 
the press’ role during the interwar period. How 
should scholars investigate conferences convened 
by and for the press? How can we evaluate jour-
nalists’ associations and conceptualize their role 
within the interwar diplomatic framework? More 
specifically, how did the press fit into the League 
of Nations’ efforts towards disarmament? Answers 
or debates on these questions cut to the core of 
understanding how journalists saw their role as 
transmitters  of  League  international  news  and 
how the League relied on and nurtured journalists 
as their best method of reaching the public, whose 
opinion they cherished.
Over the past few decades, scholars have debated 
the  virtues  and  vices  of  both  comparative  and 
transnational  approaches  to  history;  such  con-
versations have often cut to the heart of the very 
aims of historical research. These discussions have 
interrogated  the  implicit  biases,  methods  and 
results of scholarship and challenged historians 
to reconceptualize their objects of study both in 
scope and scale. I aim to provide an overview of 
the main debates about comparative and transna-
tional history, and then to reflect on the specific 
uses of both for the history of journalism and the 
press. This short survey of transnational and com-
parative history does not intend to pit the two 
approaches against each other. Indeed, as I hope 
to show in regards to the press, the most fruitful 
work combines both.
The  Case  for  Comparative  and 
Transnational History
Comparative History
John Stuart Mill’s reflections on the vices and vir-
tues of comparison in 1882 illustrate some of the 
core concerns of comparative history even today: 
investigations of similarities and differences, and 
attempts to use them logically to understand cau-
sal relationships. Mill suggested that there were 
two methods of comparison: the Method of Ag-
reement and the Method of Disagreement.5 The 
Method of Agreement tried to find common ele-
ments between phenomena, though he empha-
sized that this could only elicit laws and commo-
nalities between phenomena, rather than discover 
causes. When there is more than one cause, the 
Method of Agreement can only identify that two 
cases have these influences in common, but can-
not prove a causal relationship.
For Mill we can discover causes only through the 
Method of Difference, “the most perfect of the 
methods of experimental inquiry.”6 The Method 
of Difference tried to understand causes by look-
ing for examples that are the same in all respects 
except the one under investigation. Yet he recog-
nized that this ideal situation was impossible to 
apply to social phenomena, suggesting that we 
instead examine classes where a phenomenon is 
present in one and absent in the other, such as a 
country with free trade versus one with restric-
tive measures. Nevertheless, Mill concluded that 
neither of these methods is able to identify causes 
for trends and events. Rather, there are countless 
potential influences; even if a circumstance did 
not produce an effect in one instance, this does 
not mean that it cannot produce this effect un-
der a different set of conditions. For Mill, “we can 
conclude that the effect is sometimes produced 
without it [a phenomenon]; but not that, when 
present, it does not contribute its share.”7
5  J. S. Mill, “Two Methods of Comparison,” in Amitai    
  Etzioni and Frederic Dubow (eds.), Comparative 
  Perspectives: Theories and Methods (Boston: Little, Brown,  
  1969), 205-213.
6  Ibid., 211.
7  Ibid., 213.m&z 4/2010
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In the 1920s, Marc Bloch built on reflections by 
Durkheim and Mill, amongst others, to plead for 
the use of the comparative method in history.8 For 
Bloch, writing in the aftermath of the destruction 
of  World  War  I,  comparative  history  was  not 
just a means to extend our historical knowledge, 
but also served the political goal of developing a 
common scientific language amongst historians 
of  different  nationalities.  According  to  Bloch, 
the first step in comparative history entailed the 
discovery of a viable geographical area of inves-
tigation. Indeed, in contrast to later historians’ 
concentration on the nation as the basic unit of 
comparison, Bloch believed that comparative his-
tory “demands most insistently that we abandon 
obsolete  topographical  compartments  in  which 
we  pretend  to  enclose  social  realities;  they  are 
quite unfit for the contents which we force into 
them.”9 Bloch hoped that the comparison of relat- 
ed societies, a method he favoured over universal 
comparisons, would allow historians above all to 
discover causes of differences and similarities in 
comparable societies. Bloch’s comparative history 
bequeathed us no particular methodology. Yet it 
remained important for its appeal not only to use 
the comparative perspective, but also for its insi-
stence upon questioning our units of analysis.10
In the United States at least, in the 1960s and 
1970s,  comparison  became  a  touchstone  for 
understanding  democracy  and  revolution  for 
sociologists such as Theda Skocpol and political 
scientists concerned with comparisons of civili-
zations, principally Barrington Moore.11 Mean- 
while, comparison garnered renewed interest in 
the historical discipline in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Charles Maier’s now classic Recasting Bour-
geois Europe (first published in 1979) emphasized 
how comparison can lead us to ask new questions 
about the interwar years in Europe, particularly in 
demonstrating its potential for stability.12 Other 
historians, such as Raymond Grew, argued that, 
“to call for comparison is to call for a kind of atti-
tude – open, questioning, searching – and to sug-
gest some practices that may nourish it.”13 As em-
phasized by later historians such as Jürgen Kocka 
and Gerhard Haupt, comparison highlights new 
problems, developments and questions, forces us 
to reflect more deeply on our explanatory models 
and research methodologies, and forces us to con-
sider similarities and differences.14
Yet comparison’s calls for openness left histori-
ans in search of a methodology. Here German, 
French, and Anglo-American historiography have 
diverged in recent years. Comparative history has 
been criticized for reifying the nation as a catego-
ry in the Anglo-American world and for failing 
to  deal  sufficiently  with  causality.15  In  France, 
transfer history, as espoused by Michel Espagne, 
emphasizes how transfers of knowledge across na-
tional boundaries create “national” cultures, while 
histoire croisée, propounded by Bénédicte Zimmer-
mann and Michael Werner, argues that we have 
to historicize our methods and objects of analysis 
and understand how we as historians are also the 
product of “entangled history”. Comparative his-
tory remains an extremely popular methodology 
8  For a discussion of antecedents to Bloch’s ideas on 
  comparative history, see Maurice Aymard, “Histoire et   
    comparison,” des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales École   
  and Deutsches Historisches Institut (Paris, France) Marc  
  Bloch Aujourd’hui: Histoire Comparée & Sciences Sociales  
  (Paris: Editions de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences  
  Sociales, 1990), 271-278.
9  Marc Bloch, “Toward a Comparative History of European  
  Societies” (1928), in Frederic Chapin Lane and Jelle C.  
  Riemersma (eds.), Enterprise and secular change; readings in 
  economic history (Homewood, Ill.: R.D. Irwin, 1953), 
  517. Other important early advocates of the comparative  
  method are Henri Pirenne and Otto Hintze.
10  For the heated discussion on Bloch’s importance for 
  comparative history, see Alette Olin Hill and Boyd H. 
  Hill, “AHR Forum: Marc Bloch and Comparative Histo- 
  ry,” The American Historical Review 85, 
  no. 4 (October 1980): 828-857; Charles J. Halperin et. al,  
  “AHR Forum: Comparative History in Theory and Practi- 
  ce: A Discussion,” The American Historical     
  Review 87, no. 1 (February 1982): 123-143; William 
  H. Sewell and Sylvia L. Thrupp, “[Marc Bloch and 
  Comparative History]: Comments,” The American  
  Historical Review 85, no. 4 (October 1980): 847-853;    
    William H.Sewell, “Marc Bloch and the Logic of  
  Comparative History,” History and Theory 6, no. 2 (1967):  
  208-218; Alette Olin Hill and Boyd H. Hill, “[Marc    
  Bloch and Comparative History]: Reply,”      
  The American Historical Review 85, no. 4 (October 1980):  
  854-857.
11  Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship 
  and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the    
  Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Theda 
  Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative 
  Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cam- 
  bridge University Press, 1979).  For a critique of sociolog-
  ical typologies, see Peter Baldwin, “Comparing and 
  Generalizing: Why All History is Comparative, Yet No   
  History is Sociology,” in Comparison and History: Europe  
  in Cross-National Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2004),  
  1-22.
12  Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization  
  in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World   
  War I (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1988).
13  Raymond Grew, “The Case for Comparing Histories,”   
  The American Historical Review 85, no. 4 (October 1980):  
  776.
14  “Historischer Vergleich: Methoden, Aufgaben, Probleme.  
  Eine Einleitung,” in Haupt and Kocka (eds.), Geschichte 
  und Vergleich: Ansätze und Ergebnisse international verglei- 
  chender Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt/Main: Campus,  
  1996), 9-46.
15  See Peter Baldwin’s and Michael Miller’s essays in Com-
  parison and History, 1-22, 115-132.m&z 4/2010
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in Germany, however, where it has been defended 
as an approach for a “more theoretically oriented, 
analytic type of history.”16 Hartmut Kaelble’s in-
troductory work to comparative history countered 
suggestions to comparative history’s amorphous 
methodology by suggesting a typology of compa-
risons to enable the historian to comprehend the 
particularities of the phenomena under investiga-
tion and to choose appropriate units of compari-
son.17 Indeed, for Haupt and Kocka, comparison 
concerns itself with similarities and differences, 
rather than understanding change over time. To 
put it another way, comparison aims to under-
stand synchronic situations, but cannot be used 
to explain diachronic developments. Comparison 
can illustrate snapshots while other approaches to 
history investigate how the negatives developed 
into those snapshots in the first place.
Transnational History
The main response to criticisms of comparative 
history has been transnational history.18 The his-
tory  of  the  term  “transnational”  itself  stretches 
back at least to a 1916 essay called “Transnational 
America” by Randolph Bourne, which called in a 
certain sense for a form of American cultural plu-
rality.19 Just as Chris Lorenz has emphasized the 
importance of politics for choosing comparisons, 
the rise of transnational history too was sparked 
by contemporary political events.20 In Germany, 
much  comparative  historical  research  took  its 
impetus from debates about the Sonderweg. For 
transnational history, the end of the Cold War and 
the resulting new geopolitical circumstances led 
historians to question the nation more than they 
had before. Especially in the last decade, “trans-
national” has become a byword for that openness 
to new approaches advocated by Raymond Grew 
for comparative history in 1980. To paint its var-
ious  historical  trends  with  broad  brushstrokes, 
transnational history aims to understand pheno-
mena passing across, undermining, and indeed 
creating the nation-state. It searches for actors, 
organizations,  and  ideas  that  cross  boundaries 
and constitute groups, networks and flows. In- 
deed,  adherents  of  transnational  history  argue 
that we can only understand how the very nation 
itself was produced transnationally by examining 
how ideas about nation disseminated through Eu-
rope in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.21 
The emergence in the mid-nineteenth century of 
liberal ideals of a unified Germany, for example, 
were greatly influenced by Mazzini in Italy, and in 
the later 1860s, nationally-minded Prussians es-
pecially looked to Cavour and Piedmont-Sardinia 
as a model for Prussia and Germany.
Transnational history seeks to address the main 
criticism  leveled  at  comparison:  that  by  con-
centrating on similarities and differences, it has 
obscured how societies have mutually influenced 
each other. It allows historians to focus on pro-
cesses and diachronic developments, rather than 
single events that may elude constructive com-
parison in the first place. This approach pushes 
historians to remain receptive to other units of 
analysis than the nation and to understand con-
temporaries’ networks that sometimes spread in 
decidedly non-national directions. Transnational 
history questions traditional temporal and spati-
al divisions. As Patricia Clavin notes, it “allows 
us to consider the processes by which change is 
facilitated  on  a  different  timescale.”22  Spatial-
ly, transnational history has come to encompass 
much  work  on  colonialism  and  imperialism.23   
For  Jürgen  Osterhammel,  transnational  history 
has rediscovered the importance of geography in 
its attention to borders and territoriality.24
Despite its purported openness, however, trans-
national history has been criticized on a number 
of grounds. Firstly, it often presents too positive 
and progressive a picture, wherein the world ad-
vances teleologically towards ever more intercon-
nection and transnational structures.25 Secondly, 
its very openness can allow vagueness to creep 
16  Haupt and Kocka in Ibid., 25.
17  Hartmut Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich: Eine Einführung
  zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt/Main: Campus  
  Verlag, 1999).
18  Other responses to the perceived problems of comparative  
  history have included histoire croisée and transfer history,  
  though these approaches are transnational in their empha- 
  sis on transfer and entanglement across national bounda- 
  ries. See Matthias Middell, “Kulturtransfer und historische  
  Komparatistik. Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis,” Comparativ  
  10, no. 1 (2000): 7-41.
19  For the history of the term “transnational”, see Ian Tyrell,  
  “What is transnational history?,” 2008, http://iantyrrell. 
  wordpress.com/what-is-transnational-history/; Patricia   
  Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism,” Contemporary 
  European History 14, no. 4 (2005): 421-439.
20  Chris Lorenz, “Comparative Historiography: Problems    
  and Perspectives,” History and Theory 38, no. 1 (February 
  1999): 25-39.
21  Ian Tyrrell, Transnational nation: United States history in  
  global perspective since 1789 (Basingstoke, England:    
  Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
22  Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism,” 428.
23  For Germany, a key work is Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen  
  Osterhammel, Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland  
  in der Welt 1871-1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
  Ruprecht, 2004).
24  Jürgen Osterhammel, “Transnationale Gesellschafts-
  geschichte: Erweiterung oder Alternative?,” Geschichte und  
  Gesellschaft 27, no. 3 (2001): 464-479.
25  David Armitage, “Is There a Pre-History of  
  Globalization?,” in Comparison and History, 165-176.m&z 4/2010
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into works on transnational history. Finally, as Jo-
hannes Paulmann notes for cultural transfers, we 
can only understand the importance of a trans-
fer by comparing, at least implicitly, our object’s 
status, name and meaning in the culture whence 
it came.26 Similarly, Glenda Sluga argues that we 
have to understand how people at the time used 
comparison to create what have later been iden-
tified as transnational phenomena. For example, 
American, French and British concepts about na-
tions critically influenced the composition of the 
nation-states created from the Habsburg Empire 
after World War I. Comparison by Central Eu-
ropean elites at the time fuelled their desire for a 
nation-state to emulate Anglo-American political 
structures. Thus  for  Sluga,  “conventional  char-
acterizations of the nature of nations are them-
selves the ideological products of the processes 
of comparison.”27 The development of national 
sentiment and later nationalism rely upon com-
parisons between one’s own nation and another. 
Yet the ideological basis for these comparisons is 
very often trends and thoughts that have dissemi-
nated across the very borders of those nations that 
compare themselves.
The Outlook for History of the Press
Both comparative and transnational history offer 
many fruitful approaches for the history of the 
press.  Firstly,  communications  historians  have 
long been aware of the importance of choosing 
commensurable  units  of  analysis,  particularly   
given their empirical bent. Secondly, comparative 
history has allowed historians of the press to con-
tribute to our understanding about the influence 
of historical context and generational experience 
upon journalists.28 Thirdly, as exemplified by Jean 
Chalaby, historians of the press have used com-
parison to demonstrate the thesis that modern 
journalism and news are an “Anglo-American in-
vention.”29
Yet these comparisons leave us with certain ques-
tions. In establishing the creation of norms and 
practices,  how  exactly  did  these  enter  specific 
national contexts? Who precisely were the agents 
of this change? For Chalaby, the French public 
became  exposed  to  Anglo-American  discourse 
centered on facts through the launch of Matin 
in  1883  by  American  financiers. Transnational 
history gives historians the opportunity to inves-
tigate those categories of actors who agitated be-
yond national borders and sought to gain success 
through dissemination of particular norms and 
business practices.
As  regards  the  press,  the  Anglo-American  and 
French realms of news had in fact been intertwined 
in several ways since the mid-nineteenth century. 
Despite differences in concepts of news, the news 
agency cartel system meant that the French, Brit-
ish, and Germans at least had been consistently 
supplied  with  the  others’  news  from  the  mid-
nineteenth century onwards. This global arrange-
ment complicates our ability to compare national 
press systems, for example, given their common 
suppliers  for  much  news. The  German  Wolffs   
Telegraphisches  Bureau  (WTB),  the  French 
Agence Havas and British Reuters Telegram Com-
pany constituted the ‘Big Three’ modern news 
agencies from the mid-nineteenth century.30 The 
‘Big Three’ operated a formal global cartel on news 
collection from 1870 until around 1933, whereby 
they divided the global supply of news between 
them: each agency reported on its assigned sphere 
and supplied this news for free to the other two.
News supply was a transnational affair from the 
start: the founders of the ‘Big Three’ had worked 
together at Agence Havas in 1848 and cooperated 
informally from the foundation of Reuters (1851) 
and the WTB (1849). Personal contacts were key 
to the three agencies’ stranglehold on global news 
and  continued  to  be  vitally  important  during 
every  renegotiation  of  the  cartel  contract. The 
cartel arrangement dominated the world of news 
agencies for sixty years, surviving World War I; 
it ended in 1933-34 when the Nazis merged the 
WTB  and  the  Hugenberg-owned Telegraphen-
Union, to create the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, 
and when the Associated Press forced Reuters to 
abandon cartel arrangements. Under the cartel, 
the WTB was responsible for Germany, its colo-
nies, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Scandinavia 
and Russia. Agence Havas concerned itself with 
France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and South America, 
while Reuters gathered news from its empire and 
26  Johannes Paulmann, “Internationaler Vergleich und 
  interkultureller Transfer: Zwei Forschungsansätze zur    
  europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts,” 
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North America.31 Within its sphere, each agency 
negotiated contracts of news exchange with parti-
cular national and imperial news agencies.32 These 
agencies’ cooperation with particular national or 
imperial news agencies stifled competition within 
those countries, as other news agencies had little 
or no access to foreign news, and thus determi-
ned which news agencies within various countries 
were successful. 
To complicate the picture yet further, these agen-
cies  sent  their  news  through  telegraphs  cables 
often  owned  by  the 
British  before  World 
War  I  and  indeed,  re-
gulated  through  the 
International  Telegraph 
Union  (ITU).  The 
ITU, founded in 1865, 
constitutes  one  of  the 
first  intergovernmental 
organizations  and  esta-
blished  agreements  on 
telegraph lines, tariffs and telegraphic systems.33 
The press thus became one of the first industries 
whose  commodity,  information,  was  partially 
governed internationally by the emergence of le-
gislation through conventions and international 
conferences from the 1860s.  
Other aspects of the press overlay the apparently 
national grid of newspapers. The establishment of 
the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) in 
1926, for example, represented one effort to coor-
dinate journalistic activity across national and im-
perial boundaries. When the League of Nations 
consulted governments prior to conferences on 
the press in 1927 and 1931, it also asked the IFJ 
for its opinion on various matters relating to the 
press. The IFJ thus held the same status for the 
League of Nations, at least, as governments.
Finally,  languages,  concerns,  and  styles  often 
crossed  national  or  imperial  boundaries.34  As 
Marcel  Broersma  has  pointed  out,  forms  and 
styles cross borders more readily than many had 
assumed.35 By examining how forms and styles 
became  transnational,  perhaps  we  can  begin 
to understand why these might be more readily 
transferrable than content or institutional struc-
tures. For instance, who exactly was involved in 
the dissemination of forms and styles? Were par-
ticular organizations or events catalysts for these 
developments?  The  Paris  Peace  Conference  in 
1919 and later conferences at the League of Na-
tions provided vital meeting points for journalists 
from much of the world, for example. These jour-
nalists and news agency reporters certainly com-
pared their coverage to others, 
reflecting on their relative suc-
cess or failure in disseminating 
news back home. Yet they were 
also influenced by methods and 
techniques from other countries 
from the number of telegrams 
sent a day to the type of repor-
ting itself.
The different networks sketched 
above highlight new areas of re-
search for historians of the press if we open our 
gaze beyond the comparative and the national. 
Transnational history involves a search for agents 
and networks beyond and across the nation; re-
search can trace the active creation or destruction 
of those connections and their dissemination. It 
can  encourage  research  of  hitherto  overlooked 
phenomena such as intergovernmental organiza-
tions and conferences, such as the League of Na-
tions Press Conferences that I will discuss below.
Yet the comparative shouldn’t be left out in the 
cold.  Journalists  and  governments  often  com-
pared  themselves  to  others  and  assessed  their   
achievements in relation to others’ successes. For 
the German government of World War I, for ex-
ample, their lack of influence on neutral countries 
could only be explained by comparison to British 
agitations through Reuters in the pre-war period. 
Government press officials lamented by compar-
ison their relative lack of news dissemination in 
South America and East Asia prior to World War 
I and blamed it for the hostility from these coun-
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tries  during  the  war.  Comparison  with  Britain 
spurred Germany to develop its wireless news net-
works and broadcast on the sea in the early post-
war period; without understanding the urgency 
of these comparisons for officials at the time and 
the conclusions they drew from them, we gain an 
incomplete picture of motivations for the swift 
development of wireless and also for the German 
government to disseminate news for free to ships. 
Conversely, we can only understand the press ba-
ron, Lord Northcliffe’s somewhat overblown re-
action to discovering this news if we remember 
that for a man like Northcliffe, power of the press 
equaled political power. If German news spread 
further than British, then in comparison, British 
influence  was  under  threat.36  Comparison  pro-
vides the means to assess these claims and to un-
derstand their validity for contemporaries.
Finally, comparison stops historians from forget-
ting about the importance of the nation, as Su-
san Pedersen points out.37 According to Charles 
S. Maier, a new history of the twentieth century 
needs to take into account its emphasis on ter-
ritoritality,  meaning  the  “properties,  including 
power, provided by the control of a border poli-
tical space.”38 This new periodization portrays the 
twentieth century as a century from the 1860s to 
1960s/1970s, when control over a particular terri-
tory (and its resources) was the dominant concern. 
In our eagerness to find those who did not fit into 
state and territorial structures, we cannot neglect 
the paradigmatic status of the nation-state.
The Fight against False 
Information
The League of Nations and Journalists
In  the  Convention  establishing  the  League  of 
Nations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, 
Article VIII stated that the maintenance of peace 
required the reduction of armaments to the low-
est point possible. Disarmament came to mean 
not  just  the  reduction  of  physical  armaments, 
but also moral disarmament. Moral disarmament   
aimed  to  encourage  international  cooperation 
and understanding to ensure that war between 
nations could no longer be possible. The League’s 
first committee, formed in 1919 upon the man-
date from Article 23 (e) of the League Covenant, 
addressed  communication  and  transport,  indi-
cating  the  central  importance  placed  upon  the 
press as a promoter of peace from the very start 
of the League’s existence. In moral disarmament 
and intellectual cooperation, journalists played a 
key role in the dissemination of information and 
establishment of new discursive norms on peace, 
and truth in particular.
Older interpretations of the League of Nations 
have dismissed it as a body “with no teeth” that 
ultimately  failed  to  prevent World War  II  and 
whose international record on issues such as man-
dates, was murky at best. Historians of Germany, 
for instance, have argued that Germany through 
the Weimar Republic only instrumentalized the 
League  to  attempt  to  revise  the Treaty  of Ver-
sailles.39 Others have highlighted that even the 
“high” period of international cooperation after 
Locarno in 1925 and before the Great Depression 
in 1929 actually relied upon negotiations behind 
the scenes between Aristide Briand, Gustav Stre-
semann and Austin Chamberlain.40 On the other 
hand, more recent works have emphasized that 
Germany  differentiated  between  the  Versailles 
and Geneva systems, and took the framework of 
Geneva seriously, not simply pursuing revisionist 
aims.41 Meanwhile, Susan Pedersen has empha-
sized that for all its failings, the League did matter: 
at Geneva, “internationalism was enacted, institu-
tionalized, and performed.”42 She calls for further 
examination of the mechanisms of governance at 
the League of Nations to understand how it in-
teracted with its various publics and how it laid 
the groundwork for many aspects of the UN and 
other organizations that still exist today, such as 
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the International Labour Organization.
More specifically, for my work on the press, pub-
lic opinion took on a vastly increased importance 
in connection with the League of Nations after 
World War I. We can take as one key example Jan 
Smuts, who wrote the first outline of the League 
of Nations to be made public and subsequent-
ly published in early 1919. This pamphlet, The 
League of Nations. A Practical Suggestion, is the 
main reason that he is generally acknowledged as 
one of the fathers of the League of Nations. The 
pamphlet greatly influenced Wilson and became 
the basis for the draft Covenant of the League pre-
sented to the Plenary Session of the Peace Con-
ference on February 14, 1919. In the aftermath 
of World War One, Smuts felt that international 
structures and laws had been totally transformed, 
warranting the creation of a very new kind of 
global order. He believed in “public opinion” as 
the ultimate judge and motivating force of these 
diplomatic undertakings. The formation of pub-
lic opinion had in fact been Smuts’s first aim in 
writing Practical Suggestion. He believed that the 
League could only be a success when it was sup-
ported by “a powerful international public opin-
ion.” Furthermore, “the enlightened public all over 
the world will have to be taught to think interna-
tionally, to look at public affairs, not merely from 
the sectional national point of view, but also from 
a broad human international point of view.”43 He 
was not the only one. Indeed, Susan Pedersen’s 
articles on the League of Nations mandate system 
have emphasized just this point: for her, the man-
date system is best conceived as a “discursive arena 
and not an administrative system.”44 What really 
mattered, Pedersen has argued, is that “League 
oversight  proliferated  information  and  publici-
ty about the mandates and conferred legitimacy 
to those powers that complied with the system’s 
formal requirements and professed to uphold its 
norms.”45
Journalists and the press thus served several vital 
purposes in the League of Nations, although this 
has been somewhat neglected in the historiogra-
phy. Firstly, they were key conveyors of moral dis-
armament and other developments at the League 
to their publics at home. Secondly, the growth in 
politicians’ belief in public opinion meant that 
journalists became more important than ever be-
fore in disseminating the information that would 
influence that public favourably. Thirdly, journa-
lists vitally contributed to the discursive language 
of the League, such as the mandate system and its 
norms. They helped to establish for the League 
what Peter Haas calls an “epistemic community”:   
a community of interest, based on the principle of 
inclusion, with a communal character, composed 
of individuals sharing the same location or orga-
nization.46 Epistemic communities rely for their 
cohesion upon knowledge-based networks; these 
networks  built  and  expanded  upon  journalists’ 
connections with their newspapers and agencies, 
and  the  technological  framework  of  telegraph,   
telephone, and, later, wireless. Yet the League also 
provided a space for the creation of this episte-
mic community: during conferences, journalists 
of different nationalities met and interacted, and 
began to develop a more cohesive (or more con-
tested?) vision of what journalism was and what it 
could achieve for the League of Nations.
These points were not lost on League officials. 
The League placed great emphasis on public opi-
nion and close cooperation between the League 
and journalists to supply the press with factual 
information  about  the  League  and  conferences 
held under its auspices. Through its Information 
Section, the League effected what has been called 
“a revolutionary change in the relationship bet-
ween diplomatic activities and the public.”47 It 
published a monthly summary of League activi-
ties along with pamphlets and brochures concer-
ning subjects of particular interest to the public. 
Indeed, the Information Section was one of the 
largest sections with 12 members in 1920 and 19 
in 1930; it was also the only section whose mem-
bers were appointed to deal with their respective 
nationalities. Thus German nationals dealt with 
the German-speaking press for instance. The In-
formation Section also organized and acted upon 
the proposal for the first independent conference 
of the League of Nations: a Conference of Press   
Experts in 1927. This was followed by a second 
conference in Copenhagen in 1932 and a final, 
third conference in Madrid in 1933. Both the 
preparation and execution of these conferences 
provide us with insights into the interaction bet-
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ween the League of Nations and the press, the 
importance of conferences in establishing global 
practices and norms, and the press’s vision of its 
mission and place within those norms and prac-
tices.
Conferences at the League of Nations
After  a  proposal  from  the  Chilean  delegate  in 
1925, the League of Nations Assembly resolved to 
convene a Conference of Press Experts in 1927 to 
suggest detailed regulation of the press in matters 
from  journalists’  visas  to  facilitating  newspaper 
transportation.  A  resolution  on  the  conference 
by  the  Council  in  December  1927  stated  that 
conferences should be convened as necessary to 
debate further issues as they arose. The next con-
ference was called for 1932 in Copenhagen. Over 
and above conferences for the press, internation-
al  conferences  convened  by  governments  were 
relatively recent phenomena, dating back to the 
mid-nineteenth century and proliferating rapid-
ly after World War I. These conferences had few 
international legal precedents or procedural con-
ventions to fall back on and thus the late 1920s 
onwards saw a spate of publications on conduct at 
international conferences.  These works acknow-
ledged that the League of Nations had become 
the “natural center for the coordinated action of 
the nations of the world in almost every field of 
international activity.”48
Writing  in  1929,  Frederick  Sherwood  Dunn 
noted that “the international regulation of acti-
vities that do not coincide with the geographical 
boundaries  of  existing  jurisdictions  has  made 
necessary the development of new types of col-
lective action which can deal with interests and 
transactions  from  the  standpoint  of  the  whole 
public affected by them.”49 For the press, these 
issues included regulation of press rates, the re-
moval of censorship, the provision of safe pas-
sage for journalists and ID cards recognizing their 
particular professional status. The press’s concerns 
often overlapped with those of the conferences 
on communication and transit, and indeed, the 
Conference of Press Experts at Geneva in 1927 
was part of a larger meeting of the Committee 
on Communication and Transit.50 This commit-
tee had in fact paid the most attention to method 
and procedure during its conferences; as the first 
committee to be established, it often served as a 
model for other committees and technical organs 
at the League of Nations.51 Indeed, at the time, 
H. R. G. Greaves called its format of a technical 
international committee “an invaluable means of 
invention,” whose officials “at their best form a 
link between the national and the universal out-
look.”52 Thus its approach to the constitution of 
conferences often functioned paradigmatically for 
future conferences held by the League. In parti-
cular, I will examine the League’s appeal to 64 
countries before the Conference of Press Experts 
in Madrid in 1933 to provide suggestions on how 
to prevent the “spread of false information which 
may threaten to disturb the peace or the good un-
derstanding between nations.”53
Comparing Concepts of Truth?
After the success of the Conference of Press Ex-
perts in Copenhagen in January 1932, the League 
Council  called  another  conference  for  Madrid 
in  1933.  At  the  Copenhagen  conference,  del-
egates had suggested that there might be more 
coordination  between  states  in  securing  peace. 
The Council and Assembly eagerly seized on the 
opportunity to further their aim of moral disar-
mament through the press and sent a circular to 
64 countries that reached over 130 press organi-
zations. They received replies from 16 individual 
countries’  organizations  and  two  international 
journalists’ organizations, including that of jour-
nalists accredited to the League of Nations. These 
replies demonstrate not only journalists’ concern 
with  the  idea  of  “truth”  and  its  connection  to 
peace, but also practical concerns for us as histo-
rians about how to analyze terms and their com-
parability. As Marcel Broersma has pointed out, 
“journalism’s claim to truth is the main feature of 
the journalism discourse”; striving for this truth 
has become “the basis for the social code shared 
by journalists and their reading audience.”54 Yet 
“true” and “false” are of course values whose exact 
meaning is somewhat blurry. Truth, like beauty, 
is somewhat in the eye of the beholder. The true 
can be the factually correct, the logically true, or 
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the politically true, to give three simple examples. 
As the replies to the League of Nations illustrate, 
journalists’ associations interpreted the concepts 
of “true” and “false” information in very different 
ways with important consequences for our under-
standing of the nature of journalistic discourse in 
the interwar period.
To summarize the replies briefly, they came from 
associations in countries as far-flung as Honduras, 
Italy, and New Zealand. The IFJ encompassed 
most  European  national  associations:  this  was 
the main reason that there were fewer replies nu-
merically to this League request for information 
than there had been in 1927 on the protection of 
news.55 The IFJ, founded in 1926, had begun to 
operate as the umbrella organization for German, 
French, and many Central and Eastern European 
national associations; its reply in 1932 demon-
strates how it had cemented its status as the repre-
sentative organ for multiple associations. Indeed, 
this function continued after World War Two up 
to the present day. The International Association 
of Journalists Accredited to the League of Nations 
unsurprisingly gave the fullest answer as the repre-
sentative of journalists reporting on the League. 
The content of the answers varied from the Brit-
ish Empire Union’s direct dismissal of the topic 
of false news to the International Association of 
Journalists Accredited to the League of Nations, 
which suggested detailed preventative and reme-
dial measures to address false news. 
In some ways, these replies offer an ideal oppor-
tunity to compare different national conceptions 
of false news. Yet we have to be careful to avoid 
equating what Bloch called “homonyms”: terms 
that appeared to mean the same thing, but in fact 
indicated something different. Replies to the cir-
cular relied upon translation of the original circu-
lar into languages ranging from Polish to Swedish 
to Turkish, and then translating replies back into 
French and English, the official languages of the 
League. Translation, of course, always involves a 
degree of interpretation, and occasionally, the cre-
ation of new terms if they do not exist, as Lydia 
Liu shows for the translation of American legal 
texts into Chinese in the late nineteenth century.56 
One example for our purposes is the concept of 
Recht, droit or dritto, which in English can mean 
either “law” or “right”. Over and above transla-
tion issues, the replies indicate that even those 
who spoke the same mother tongue interpreted 
the adjective “false” very differently.
In this particular context, we can see from the re-
plies from the International Federation of Journa-
lists and the Australian Journalists’ Association that 
they interpreted the meaning of “false news” very 
differently. For the Australians, false news meant 
“untruthful or sensational presentation of interna-
tional news.”57 For the International Federation of 
Journalists, on the other hand, “false news” was an 
amorphous term, which could be subdivided into 
three  categories.  Firstly,  journalists  occasionally 
supplied incorrect news, which they had thought 
to be factually accurate. Secondly, there was ten-
dentious news, whereby particular groups sought 
to use news for their own gains. Thirdly, false 
information entailed deliberate forgery or distor-
tion of news. Given these divergent definitions, 
it comes as little surprise that the two Associa-
tions reached very different conclusions about fu- 
ture actions on the subject. The Australians called 
for daily dissemination of news through wireless 
and an international journal to serve as a form of 
watchdog for truthful international news. Mean-
while, the IFJ believed that journalists alone were 
qualified to judge which category a “false” news 
item fell into each time and that the only discipli-
nary authority was the International Journalists’ 
Court of Honour that had been established at the 
Hague in 1931. In essence, the IFJ argued on the 
basis of prior misinterpretations of “false news” by 
other authors, that only journalists could judge 
their colleagues. Journalists should have “inter-
national cards” to identify them as professionals 
and only fellow professionals could judge how a 
journalist had sinned. This was a bold statement 
for internal regulation of a journalistic habitus, 
which contrasted with the Australians’ belief that 
an international journal could serve as an external 
standard by which all readers could theoretically 
judge journalists.
Meanwhile,  although  it  professed  a  polite  wil-
lingness to help, the British Empire Union’s re-
ply clearly indicated that the very idea of a sur-
vey on “false news” almost constituted an insult. 
The Union equated “false news” with an “abuse 
of the freedom of the Press”, somewhat akin to 
the more restrictive Australian definition. For the 
Union, however, public opinion would criticize 
any such news item so heavily that given the com-
petition amongst various organs of the press, they 
would be loath to become repeat offenders.58  The 
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market and public opinion were the preventative 
cures for any transgression of truth. Any other 
method would be “difficult to reconcile with Brit-
ish conceptions of the rights of free publication 
of news and free comment.”59 In the British Em- 
pire  Union’s  interpretation,  opinion  and  com-
ment served as correctives to false facts.
By contrast, for the International Association of 
Journalists Accredited to the League of Nations, 
the freedom required to prevent false news ex-
tended far beyond freedom of the press to finan-
cial freedom from advertisers and publishers and 
freedom for journalists to act as eye-witnesses to 
breaking stories and diplomatic negotiations. This 
radical  suggestion  based  itself  on  the  observa-
tion that, “only in the newspaper do people any-
where still believe that they can get something for 
nothing – and that something is the most precious 
of things, the truth, and the truth almost instan-
taneously.”60 As readers were unwilling to pay full 
price for the gathering of their news, advertisers 
and publishers aka businessmen had gained inor-
dinate and inappropriate power over newspapers 
and their content, according to the Association. It 
suggested solutions ranging from expanding the 
wireless station at Geneva to provide more inter-
national news globally to establishing an impar-
tial fact-finding body to check news to creating 
financial freedom for newspapers through taxes. 
For the Association, though, prevention was the 
only measure: legal actions on cases of false news 
could not be substantiated as they were not suf-
ficiently based on facts. These proposals imputed 
to the League a power beyond its ability to re-
make radically the world of international news; 
this Association at least believed that the League 
was its best bet for transformation, rather than in-
dividual national governments.
Thus for those who perceived “false information” 
as a problem, the solutions varied greatly. The 
Association for the Journalists Accredited to the 
League of Nations presented the most radical so-
lution with its call for full financial independence 
for newspapers; the IFJ suggested greater profes-
sionalization and regulation through ID cards for 
journalists issued by the League of Nations. This 
profession should then regulate itself through the 
International  Court  of  Honour  for  Journalists. 
An International Court of Honour for Journa-
lists had been established at the Hague in 1931 to 
deal with transgressive acts by journalists, though 
it remained somewhat unclear as to what exactly 
constituted these acts. Nevertheless, the establish-
ment of the Court is an important moment in 
attempts to develop a global ethos of journalism, 
underpinned by an honorary legal framework.
The most common call was for more openness 
by  the  League  and  for  it  to  allow  journalists 
more access to diplomatic proceedings, with the   
Sino-Japanese conflict of 1931 as their main ex-
ample. In this conflict, after the Mukden Inci-
dent, Japan had taken over Manchuria from the 
Chinese in a brutal manner and was busy turning 
it  into  a  colony  of  Japan  named  Manchukuo. 
Upon China’s request, the League of Nations in-
vestigated and attempted to arbitrate the dispute, 
but the official Lytton Report of October 1932 
and subsequent League motion in February 1933 
to condemn Japan as an aggressor merely culmi-
nated in a Japanese withdrawal from the League 
of Nations in 1933. The Sino-Japanese conflict in 
1931 certainly undermined the League’s legitima-
cy in dealing with conflicts.61 Yet journalists had 
clearly not abandoned it before the publication 
of the Lytton Report, but rather felt that the so-
lution was a return to the Wilsonian principle of 
more open diplomacy. Indeed, one might argue 
that the importance of the Sino-Japanese conflict 
for journalists lay not in how it sullied their view 
of the League’s efficacy in solving diplomatic dis-
putes. Rather the replies indicate that the asso-
ciations were disturbed by how the conflict was 
addressed over and above the final result. Writing 
that “correct news is the antidote for false news” 
and  hence  pleading  for  open  access  to  League 
meetings,  the  IFJ’s  attitude  demonstrates  that 
the League’s closed-door diplomacy had hollow-
ed out the promises of openness created by its 
numerous conferences.62 The League had asked 
journalists to inform it about how to prevent false 
information;  for  the  IFJ,  the  League’s  manner 
of diplomacy was one key reason for the incre-
ase in inaccuracy. The League’s legitimacy would 
soon  be  wholly  dissolved  through  Japan’s  and 
Germany’s withdrawal in October 1933 and the   
Hoare-Laval  Pact  in  1935;  however,  for  jour-
nalists  in  1932,  the  League  had  lost  face  not 
through the failure to resolve the Sino-Japanese 
conflict, but through forbidding journalists open 
access to negotiations. Journalists suggested that 
it  was  this  closed  diplomacy  that  had  under- 
mined  public  trust  in  the  League’s  operations 
59  Ibid.
60  Ibid., 2.
61  See F. P. Walters, A history of the League of      
  Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).
62   Ibid., 13.m&z 4/2010
27
by preventing journalists from gaining access to 
accurate  information.  This  had  led  to  skewed 
reporting and, consequently, a decline in public 
faith in the League. Moreover, it demonstrated 
the divide between those writing and those ma-
king the news. The International Association for 
Journalists Accredited to the League of Nations 
felt that the League’s policy on publicity during 
the conflict illustrated, “the profound difference 
between those who are concerned with the effect 
of news and ourselves, who are concerned with its 
accuracy.”63 At the very moment that the League 
sought opinions on its ability to propagate truth, 
it had already begun to alienate its own journa-
lists’ association through a retreat from the prin-
ciple of openness upon which it had ostensibly 
been founded.
Yet the League could still function as a protago-
nist of improvements in the eyes of journalists 
in 1932, whether through a new agency to dis-
seminate international news or a world journal.
The replies generated by the League’s questions 
figure it as a repository of discussion about con-
cepts that lie at the basis of journalism and its 
purpose;  those  who  wrote  clearly  still  believed 
that the League could reform and change interna-
tional news by following journalists’ suggestions. 
The League thus pushed journalists to consider 
their values and professional desiderata in a very 
concrete  manner.  The  suggestions  foresaw  the 
League as the instigator of greater professiona-
lization through securing journalists’ status; the 
International Court of Honour so prized by the 
IFJ modeled itself to a certain extent on the Per-
manent Court of International Justice founded 
by the League of Nations. According to Marcel 
Broersma, journalism’s power derives from its per-
suasion of readers that it is relating the truth.64 
Still in 1932, the League’s power derived from its 
persuasion of journalists that it could translate 
their concerns into real action. The myriad replies 
indicate that journalists credited the League with 
an influence, which the next few years would sad-
ly prove to be overinflated. Yet the League had 
provided a discursive space for journalists to dis-
cuss and attempt to align their often conflicting 
and contradictory views on the basic principles of 
journalism, such as truth and falsity. These dis-
cussions, as I have outlined above, tell us not only 
about different national attitudes, but also about 
how  associations  such  as  the  IFJ,  and  indeed, 
the League, created the possibility of discussing   
these  issues  at  all. The  League  itself  and  jour-
nalists’ associations still believed in 1932 in the   
power of the press to effect political change and 
to modulate diplomatic paradigms in the name of 
truth. Though respondents had no unified vision 
of the meanings of “true” and “false”, all except 
the Brit-ish Empire Union found the fight against 
falsity  worthwhile  and  felt  that  the  League  of   
Nations had a vital role to play. 
Conclusion
Commentators  on  the  League  conceived  of  its 
work as transnational at the time. Charles Howard 
Ellis wrote in 1928 that, “the whole point about 
the League is that it is a deliberate attempt on the 
grand scale to organize the world for peace, and 
that means organizing on international or rather 
‘trans-national’ lines.”65 Its two main tasks were to 
inform public opinion and enact the promises and 
League machinery pledged by governments in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919.
Work  on  moral  disarmament  and  peace  invol-
ved  transnational  committees  and  conferences. 
Additionally, the IFJ functioned from 1926 as a 
transnational association whereby members flesh-
ed out their visions of journalism and compromi-
sed on their priorities. It influenced its member 
states’ conceptions of the boundaries of journa-
lists’ actions and their core values. Meanwhile, 
the League of Nations Association of Journalists 
brought together even journalists from countries 
who were not members of the League of Nations. 
With a president in 1932 who was the Geneva 
correspondent for the New York Times, the Asso-
ciation represented a meeting point for journalists 
where  they  hammered  out  proposals  for  their 
vision of international news and its protection.   
Transnational history precisely alerts us to institu-
tions such as the IFJ and events such as League of 
Nations’ conferences that slip through the cracks 
of national organizations and state structures.
On  the  other  hand,  comparative  history  is   
essential in reminding us not to forget the nation, 
the ultimate unit of dividing up the world politi-
cally, culturally and economically from 1860s to 
1960s.  Despite  cooperation  under  the  auspices 
of the League, particularly on transportation and 
technology,  most  newspapers  circulated  within 
national boundaries. Comparative history exhorts 
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us to understand similarities and differences and 
not to forget their importance for contemporaries 
in their actions and interpretations.
 
In attempting to understand journalists’ visions 
of  “true”  and  “false”,  using  both  comparative 
and transnational history is the only way to get 
at the crux of the problem. Comparative histo-
ry provides the synchronic snapshot of various 
associations’ views on the subject. Meanwhile, a 
more transnational approach enables us to see the 
emergence of common themes and encourages us 
to search for the networks that lie behind the dis-
semination of these views. Transnational history 
can  suggest  less  conventional  chronologies  and 
causalities, often offering a more diachronic ap-
proach. It can help clarify how much of the press 
got to the point that it seemed worth considering 
the issue of false information internationally at all. 
In this case, we might start in 1926 and consider 
the key role of the IFJ and its meetings in creating 
a consensus on how to combat false information, 
at least amongst its members. The IFJ’s call for 
ID cards as proof of professional status represents 
a key moment in attempts to professionalize jour-
nalism, while the call for regulation through the 
International Court of Honour demonstrates the 
IFJ’s preoccupation with creating global standards 
for journalism, though these might not have been 
enshrined in any particular law.
What does all this mean for history of the press? 
Historians of the press have to be alert to the   
similarities and differences between forms, styles 
and institutions. Comparison does provide many 
potential approaches for this research. Simultane-
ously, transnational history and cultural transfer 
can enhance our understanding of how concepts 
such as objectivity or styles such as the tabloid 
diffuse  across  borders.  An  investigation  of  the 
two methodologies shows that we cannot class 
the press neatly into national boxes, but rather 
that we must recognize the messy networks that 
overlapped, crisscrossed and intersected to create 
those apparently national press systems.
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